trying to capture and analyse more general cultural trends. 2 The Greek economic crisis has triggered a self-reflexive process and prompted a re-examination of political and cultural trends in Greece since 1974 in an attempt to rethink earlier cultural practices and answer questions such as the extent to which a cultural approach can help us understand the political and economic aspects of this crisis, and whether the crisis frames old issues in a new perspective, encouraging a more critical approach. The answers to such questions are neither easy nor straightforward. Just as the fall of the junta encouraged a re-examination of the post-civil-war period, so the current economic crisis has prompted a rethink of the metapolitefsi period. It has fostered a re-reading and retrospective criticism of the post-dictatorship transition to democracy and led to the current difficulties being seen as a result of clientelism, corruption and failed modernization. The country's post-1974 period has been turned into an interpretative framework and is often blamed for the troubled present and an uncertain future. 3 However, looking at this period ) from a cultural perspective may offer alternative paradigms and be productive by revisiting dominant models of analysis and charting cultural change in Greece.
Exploring the cultural developments that have taken place since the fall of the junta, this article will focus on two crucial and interconnected areas, namely the discussion of various manifestations of dualism as a method of cultural analysis and the increasing tension between humanist and consumerist cultural practices. 4 The first part of this article interrogates the ways in which dualism has been deployed by a range of scholars to assess the extent of Greece's modernization and how it has developed into a dominant transdisciplinary method of analysis since the 1980s. Culture in this part is discussed within a wider historical and political context. The second part looks at increasingly competing conceptions of culture in the period from junta to crisis and highlights the implications of the growing trend towards popular and material culture. 5 Although both parts deal with the coexistence of two competing cultural discourses and engage respectively with the two dreams of the metapolitefsi: modernization and consumerism, the aim is not to reaffirm oppositions or reverse hierarchies but to explore hybrid tensions and cultural ambivalences.
Dualisms and the role of the state: Modernization, hybridization and cultural ambivalence
One of the most enduring and influential interpretations of Greek cultural and political developments advanced during the metapolitefsi is that of cultural dualism, which is based on the assumption that two opposing trends or forces are vying for supremacy.
Greek culture, like Greek identity, has been seen from a dualist perspective, marked by symbolic oppositions or tensions. This approach has been adopted in different forms by anthropologists, political scientists and historians and has framed the discussions of political and cultural developments in Greece since the 1980s. 6 In the 1980s, building on Patrick Leigh Fermor's schema regarding the 'HellenoRomaic dilemma', the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld proposed the Hellenic-Romeic distinction as 'the difference between an outward-directed conformity to international expectations about the national image and an inward-looking self-critical collective appraisal'. 7 Although Herzfeld has been keen to challenge two-column diagrams (such as the one used by Leigh Fermor) as a European product, he introduced the concept of disemia to argue that Greek identity is caught between two extremes. He suggested that the Hellenic and Romeic, or 'outside' and 'inside', views of Greek culture, are the two historical images informing the respective ideals of self-presentation and self-knowledge (or self-recognition) while Korais and Zorba compete for the Greek soul. 8 In the early 1990s the political scientist Nikiforos Diamandouros explored the relationship between culture and politics in Greece and charted the evolution of two cultures, which held sway alternately according to political circumstances. 9 The older of 6 For a review of some of the discussions, see I. Katsoulis, 'Η Νεοελληνική κοινωνία: "μεταξύ" εκσυγχρονισμού και παράδοσης', The Books' Journal 73 (January 2017) 14-23. 7 (Madrid 1994) , available at http://digital.march.es/ceacsir/es/fedora/repository/ir%3A3835, and Πολιτισμικός δυισμός και πολιτική αλλαγή στην Ελλάδα της these two, the underdog culture, has been seen as marked by a pronounced introversion, xenophobia, anti-westernism, and adherence to pre-capitalist practices. 10 Defined by Diamandouros in a somewhat contradictory manner as combining a potent egalitarianism with a pre-democratic mentality, this culture competes with its younger counterpart, which has its intellectual roots in the Enlightenment and liberalism. It is also claimed that this modernizing and reformist culture, 'outward-looking and less parochial than its rival', was in the ascendant in the Greek world from the second half of the nineteenth century until the early to mid-1930s. From then on, until the mid-1970s, it entered a period of decline, following the decline of the diaspora communities and the exhaustion of the Venizelist project. However, according to Diamandouros, what might have tipped the balance in favour of this culture was Greece's increasing integration into the European Union.
More than ten years later the historians John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis adopted a different, but essentially similar, binary opposition, using Ernest Gellner's concept of the 'segmentary society', which refers to a pre-modern social structure intended to protect the extended family and and prevent the authorities from encroaching on its power. Cultural and political dualism, in its various forms, has emerged as the dominant model of and for the post-junta period but also for the earlier history of Greece. My aim here is to show its inadequacies as an interpretive methodology and question its evaluative implications and political uses. A cultural perspective can help us to reassess the operation of this dualism from the point of view of the underdog culture rather than that of the elitist modernizing culture. This, in turn, might shift attention from demarcating the discourses of the two cultures or confirming the superiority of one over the other in articulating subject positions to highlighting the instability and hybridity involved in constructing cultural identities. Greeks, for example, may simultaneously admire and hate anything associated with modern Europe. They aspire to be western while at the same time looking down on Northern Europeans, saying: 'when we were building the Parthenon, you were living in the trees' in the same way as they treat their 'homeland' as a 'whore' and a 'Madonna'.
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Recently, the cultural dualism proposed by Diamandouros has been revisited 14 and the 'underdog' culture blamed 'for bringing the country to the verge of economic and political bankruptcy'. 15 This culture has been presented and understood as being at the root of Greece's debt crisis and of the country's inability to address its structural shortcomings. 16 Despite occasional reservations, this dualism continues to inform the way Greek identity is analysed and Greece is presented as poised between a troubled tradition and a desired modernity. Trying to demarcate the two trends, the exponents of the dualist approach aim to highlight binary oppositions while its critics tend to emphasize their fusion. 17 Instances of hybridization have been explored, a good example being the fusion of the two clashing modes of time. The 'pre-modern' mode of cyclical and ritual time embodied in the celebration of name days now co-exists with an increasing awareness of the irreversible and linear time associated with birthdays.
Nowadays an increasing number of people in Greece celebrate both, whereas in the past the celebration of name days was more prevalent. 18 Critiquing the rigidity of the dualist 6 6 approach by highlighting cases of hybridization or demonstrating how an individualcentred culture co-exists with an earlier collectivist mentality is not sufficient. What is missing here is a historical and to some extent a cultural perspective, although the defenders of the dualist approach will argue otherwise. unusually early on its modernization drive. 24 State-building, therefore, seems to have followed an ambivalent process of development by being both western and non-western and carving out a space between conformity to the notion of the individual rights of western civil societies and loyalty to the extended family (segmentary society). This complicates the binary oppositions outlined above because the state is seen to act not as a modernizing but as a homogenizing and centralizing force. Although the Greek state has undergone rudimentary modernization and institutional reform over the years, its role in suppressing various manifestations of the underdog culture remained largely unchanged until the 1980s.
In the past, the state was perceived more in adversarial terms and less as a source of social security or employment. This antagonistic perception has become more nuanced since 1981 and in some cases the balance has even been reversed, while European Union subsidies have reinforced the perception of the state as provider. 25 A 'culture of entitlement' and a desire to extract compensation for the poverty and material deprivation that followed World War II developed. Complaints about state inefficiency were combined with an expectation that the state would provide jobs for life and handsome pensions. However, the expansion of the state was not accompanied by the development of a proper welfare system. During the post-junta period, instead of the state being liberalized and its grip on power being loosened, there was simply an exchange of roles in exercising authority. In this respect, the state was treated in a contradictory way -both as provider and opponent. towards the end of the twentieth century, this process started to be questioned from below by an explosion of cultural difference and diversity, which seriously undermined the notion of monoculturalism and the idea of a dominant monolithic high culture. 33 Firstly, after 1981, it involved the empowerment of rural or previously unprivileged social strata, who for the first time felt that they had a voice and could exercise some influence thanks to political and cultural changes. Secondly, the influx of migrants and various debates and controversies over minorities in Greece, as well as the rehabilitation of the Balkan and Ottoman pasts, led to changing attitudes towards otherness and regional difference. Although one might have expected that otherness would find support among those who promoted the modernizing culture paradoxically it has mostly been associated with the underdog culture, whereas the modernizing culture, relying on state authority, has sometimes been tainted with authoritarianism. After years of authoritarian practices the unshackling of otherness created a cultural and intellectual climate in which it was difficult for the modernizing culture (even in the form of the EU) to stage a comeback.
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The often patronizing, top-down practices of the modernizing culture, supported by the state, created a mentality of resistance and disobedience among representatives of the underdog culture, which tends to be egalitarian.
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Before the crisis, Greek society relied heavily on the state for employment and for funding cultural activities and projects (e.g. films subsidized by the Greek Film Centre).
As a result the neologism κρατικοδίαιτος (state-nourished) was coined. However, in a way the crisis has contributed to the detachment of people from the anchor of the state by undermining their perception of it as a secure provider and challenging the deep-seated statist mentality. People gradually lost faith in the state's accountability and its capacity for law enforcement, while the state and its institutions went from being an authoritarian agent or job provider to being a target for attack, along with the whole political system.
The growing mistrust of any government made it very hard for reform of any kind to be accepted by the public, who increasingly placed their trust in the achievements of the past and the myth of national exceptionalism.
The tension between the two cultures increased in the last quarter of the twentieth century and could be detected in a number of areas, but the outcome of this tension has been rather ambiguous. Cultural identity, according to Homi Bhabha, emerges in a contradictory and ambivalent 'Third Space of enunciation' that makes the claim to a hierarchical 'purity' of cultures untenable. 36 As in post-colonial cultures we might have to consider the mutuality and hybridization of these two cultures -although without downplaying their oppositionality -in post-authoritarian Greece. It may be useful to concentrate on three case studies from different decades of the post-junta period in order to demonstrate this tension and raise some questions. 34 The frequent reference to a 'colony of debt' to describe the bailout for the Greek economy suggests that the eurozone is seen by many Greeks as a colonizing power. 35 The historian Nicos Svoronos identified resistance, primarily towards foreign intervention, as a constant feature of modern A similar type of ambivalence can be traced in a recent study on the crisis in which modernization is defined as 'a mechanistic importation of western models without consideration of anthropological differences', although the conventions and values supporting the Greek economy and polity are recognized as differing from those of the West. 39 It is argued that identities and social bonds in Greece are based on family, friends and the community, creating a non-western 'social ethos.' This 'Greek ethos' has been considered the primary target of the austerity measures, but its status seems ambiguous, apparently coming close to the notion of the underdog culture. Douzinas claims that, although in its corrupted version this ethos promotes neo-liberalism, it is at the same time the most powerful force for resisting it. Yet there is no explanation as to how the Greek ethos, 'with its mild nationalism, secular religiosity and familial base' and its presumed resistance to westernization, performs this double act. 40 The interpretation of the economic crisis as being the result of insufficient modernization has often been questioned by Liakos and others, 41 and indeed such an approach cannot easily be applied to developments in Greek culture. Alternatively, Greeks are presented as having to cope with the conflicting tensions resulting from a fusion of dated and modern practices. For example, the mass media in Greece are considered modern in form and technology but outmoded in content, while in the social sphere the Greek nuclear family embodies competing 'archaic' and modern features. 42 Pulled in different directions, Greeks appear to walk a tightrope stretched between archaic institutions and structures and modern aspirations and lifestyles. It should be evident by now that the theory of cultural dualism tends to obscure ambivalence and hybridizations, which in turn leads to treating the state both as a source of secure employment (a survival of the earlier clientelist mentality) and as an adversary (a result of the increasingly anti-systemic discourse of the underdog culture). It seems that during the crisis this ambivalent attitude towards the state has been extended to the EU, leading to its being considered as both saviour and enemy, and thus suggesting that the crisis has simultaneously strengthened and profoundly undermined the authority of the modernizing discourse.
Having looked at cultural dualism and its limitations as an analytical tool in accounting for the belated or incomplete modernization of Greece, I will now explore how the tension between two competing notions of culture intensified in post-junta
Greece and further complicated the hierarchies involved in the dualist approaches. This was partly due to the confluence of the anti-western underdog culture and the ascendancy of a westernized consumerist culture as will be seen in the next section.
Greek culture between humanism and consumerism
The dualist approaches to Greek culture and politics discussed above gained additional Avrianismos are indicative of the cultural polarization that was developing during the 1980s. From the early 1970s onwards, youth became a less vague cultural category; new subcultures and youth slangs developed, school uniforms were abolished and students' customary leisure activities (frappé, backgammon and television, together with a taste for rebetika and old partisan songs) gradually changed. 53 The emergent combination of consumerism and radical humanism could not be sustained for long and broke down during the crisis, fostering a culture of resistance, disobedience and radicalization.
In order to better understand cultural developments in Greece, we need to delve into the ways concepts such as the 'popular' (λαϊκό) have been used over the years. The novel has been seen as a fictional caricature of the state of affairs that led Greece into the crisis and perhaps for this reason it was reprinted in 2012. 57 It also aimed to demonstrate how state machinery promoted so-called paralogotechnia ('paraliterature', i.e. popular or trashy literature), thus suggesting that alongside the earlier notion of the 'para-state' a similar concept emerged in the cultural arena after the junta.
In this case, Kotzias was not so much concerned with literature written for a mass audience, since this was a later phenomenon in Greece, but was trying to show how 56 More recently a novel published under the nom de plume Aliki Doufexi-Pope, Το ακατέργαστόν μου (Athens 2013) has satirically explored the interaction and antagonism between highbrow and popular literature. The fictional author Alkis Chatzikostis -at the suggestion of his publisher -changes from being a serious and elitist writer to being a commercially successful popular fiction writer, publishing under the pen name of Aliki Doufexi-Pope (a supposed descendant of Alexander Pope) in order to subsidize publication of his highbrow fiction (a novel of 832 pages). The irony here is that Alkis easily and successfully imitates the style of the popular writers he despises. 57 More recently in April 2017 the newspaper Το Βήμα reprinted and distributed it to its readers, describing it as a prophetic novel that offered insights to post-junta Greek culture and the current crisis.
opportunists could take advantage of state and party mechanisms in order to promote themselves and thus undermine values or blur aesthetic distinctions. Moreover, he suggests that para-literature is more of a cultural practice, a kind of subculture, increasingly fostered by state institutions during the 1980s. 58 It should be noted here that although a kind of popular literature in Greece could be traced back to the nineteenth century, 59 it was at the end of the twentieth century that it was treated as a serious commercial and aesthetic threat to high culture.
From the mid-1990s the commercialization of the novel became a feature of the production of fiction, and the setting up of the National Book Centre (EKEBI) in 1994
contributed to the trend that treated literary books as products rather than artefacts, applying quantitative criteria in exploring reading patterns and readers' responses. The rise of popular culture since the 1980s has fostered an explosion in the production of popular novels in Greece, and this may have led to the decline of the short story, which had previously dominated Greek prose fiction, although it has shown signs of recovery during the crisis. 61 In the last thirty years, the term paralogotechnia has become increasingly familiar, while popular culture in Greece has been associated with two types of fiction: best-selling novels primarily addressed to and enjoyed by a female audience 62 and works which were seen in the 1980s as promoting individualism, consumerism and the emerging media culture. 63 Both types of fiction, relying on simple storytelling and shunning formal experimentation, became increasingly associated with popular literature, and crime fiction went from being a neglected and somewhat despised genre to becoming accepted as one of the most effective methods of engaging with contemporary social problems. For many years crime fiction in Greece was considered a form of pulp fiction, but since the 1990s its reputation has been significantly enhanced and the leading crime writer, Petros Markaris, has written a number of detective novels depicting Greek society in crisis. Also, the recent rehabilitation of the crime fiction of Yannis Maris has been seen as a legitimization of popular culture in Greece. 64 Perhaps the regression in terms of narrative experimentation has to do with a reversal in the trend for subordinating function, promoted by the 'popular aesthetic', to form, favoured by the 'pure' aesthetic gaze. 65 High culture is about representation and contemplation; popular culture is about performance and what is represented, in other words the affirmation of the continuity between art and life. As Bourdieu has stated, 'intellectuals could be said to believe in the representation -literature, theatre, painting -more than in the things represented, whereas the people chiefly expect representations and the conventions which govern them to allow them to believe "naively" in the things represented'. 66 An elective 'aesthetic distance', to use Bourdieu's term, has been developed, while at the same time the detachment of the pure gaze has been challenged.
The primacy of form over function, of manner over matter, has increasingly been Although the distinction between a humanist and a lifestyle conception of culture might offer useful insights into recent cultural trends, there are some areas in which this dualistic pattern seems to break down. 68 Music and song, where the distinction between popular (λαϊκό) and high popular (έντεχνο λαϊκό) has been highlighted and debated for a long time (following the rehabilitation of rebetika and poetry set to music), could be considered as such an area. However, this kind of distinction could be challenged by the extensive hybridization of styles and the number of established poets who have written lyrics for popular songs. 69 It is not only earlier poets such as Gatsos and Leivaditis who have made their mark (and living) by writing popular lyrics, but contemporary ones as well (for example, Manos Eleftheriou and Michalis Ganas). It should also be noted that during the crisis street and hip-hop artists have increasingly blended elements from popular and elite culture.
More than other artists, poets faced the predicament of choosing elitist isolation or opening up to the wider public, thus acknowledging the incommensurability of the humanist and popular culture and at the same time trying to bridge the gap. Kiki Dimoula, a poet who is popular with the public, has been disparagingly described as the Harry Potter of Greek poetry 70 and a media phenomenon, 71 while other poets such as
Ganas have managed to transcend poetry's isolation and lack of rapport with the public by reconciling the elitism of poetry with the popularity of song, the urban with the regional and individual lyricism with collective memories. 72 In the last twenty years some poets and critics have lamented the mass production of unsophisticated poetry and its relegation to the status of a self-indulgent hobby. 73 They seem to hark back to the times when poetry in Greece was more engaged with the public and aesthetically Melancholy'. 74 It could be argued that a gradual transition towards cultural materiality is one of the main features of the period following the fall of the junta. This can be seen in the proliferation of food programmes on Greek television, the growing number of publications on cooking (including novels on the theme of cooking and food), the increasing emphasis on body care, the first gossipy life-style tabloids and the attempt to promote Greek culture not only in terms of its past but also its material present. A characteristic example of this trend is a video entitled 'Be one of us' (2013) by the students of the 'Tabula Rasa' School of Arts, which aims to promote Greece and its culture. 75 In this video images of Zorba and the Acropolis are replaced by sensory experience, food and the communal way of life.
Yet the crisis has spawned a new kind of humanism, based on the axiom that people matter more than numbers and statistics, calling for a rediscovery of human solidarity against consumerist individualism and neo-liberal austerity. 76 There is now a growing emphasis on the role of local communities and public space in an attempt to revive the sense of a spirit of human interaction among ordinary people that has been to some extent lost. The crisis has questioned the individualistic narcissism and the lifestyle culture of recent years, making the cultural ambivalence even more intense by inviting a rethink of the two dreams of the metapolitefsi: modernization and consumerism.
Conclusion
Between the fall of the junta and the onset of the crisis, Greece enjoyed its longest period of democracy and prosperity, and many institutional reforms have come primarily from the EU following a top-down approach. What I hope to have shown in this article is that by contrast, in the area of culture, we can see a bottom-up approach with an increasing prominence of materiality, diversity, otherness, popular culture and anti-systemic forces.
This has meant that cultural differences are now more widely tolerated and accepted than ever before, thus calling into question the notion of a homogeneous national culture. For
Greece this has been particularly challenging, as for many years it had endeavoured to promote national homogenization and cultural assimilation. 77 Although modernization and Europeanization were valorized by dualist approaches, the ascendancy of a diverse underdog culture, fostered by the undermining of the hierarchical distinctions between high and low, has not received proper attention despite its earlier vociferous manifestations and despite the fact that it has become a culture of resistance during the crisis. 78 The period from junta to crisis can be read as the story of two cultures and an era of increasing cultural tension and diversity, making it a testing ground for established models of analysis and one of the most dynamic periods of Greek culture. Interestingly, however, the underdog culture has been seen as largely antiwestern, whereas consumerist culture is seen as westernized, thus challenging neat oppositions and highlighting once again hybridizations and tensions in Greek culture.
Interrogating dualist interpretations and analysing cultural oppositions offers an opportunity to revisit the two main features of the culture of metapolitefsi (modernization and consumerism) and ask probing questions in the light of the current crisis.
